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National Municipal League

Competitive examinations for higher offices

New York

1916

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

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Competitive Examinations for Higher Offices

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Report of Joint Committee

of the

NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE

and the

NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE REFORM LEAGUE

with supplemental papers by

HORACE E. DEMING and RICHARD HENRY DANA

PUBLISHED FOR THE
NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE REFORM LEAGUE
79 WALL STREET, NEW YORK.
1916.

Report of the Joint Committee of the National Municipal League and the National Civil Service Reform League

The joint committee of the National Municipal League and the National Civil Service Reform League on the selection and retention of experts in municipal office calls attention to a striking distinction between the administration of cities in enlightened European countries and that of the cities in the United States. Regardless of the differences in the form and organization of municipal government in different countries of Europe, there is always at the head of each of what may be termed the operating services of city government in European cities an expert who has won his position through his expert qualifications and experience and who holds that position during continued efficiency and good conduct. In every case he has the reasonable certainty of an honorable and permanent career in the line of his chosen calling. In the United States this essential feature of successful city government is almost wholly lacking. Corresponding positions at the head of the operating services of city government here are filled by a kaleidoscopic procession of casuals, whose appointment and tenure are usually influenced by considerations of partisan politics and no permanency of tenure or hope of a career is probable, if even possible. The application of the merit system to the operating departments thus far has been, with here and there an exception, confined to subordinate positions only. This has created the anomaly that subordinates have been withdrawn from the field of partisan politics, while their superior and directing officials are still subject to its malign influence. The result upon the efficiency of the operating services of city government has been exactly what might have been expected. The absolute necessity of placing upon a permanent and independent basis the higher administrative officials who carry out, but do not create the policies of a city government has been repeatedly emphasized by eminent earnest workers for the betterment of city government in the United States. Among them that eminent

student of government here and abroad, A. Lawrence Lowell, now president of Harvard University, pointed out the need very clearly in his brief and admirable paper before the National Municipal League at its Pittsburgh meeting in 1908.

Recognition of the evil is becoming more and more general. There is a steadily increasing demand for some practical method of removing it. Your committee submits the following suggestions:

The operating departments of a city government should be manned by a force selected and retained solely because of competence to do the work of their positions. At the head of each such department should be an expert in the work of the department who holds his position without reference to the exigencies of partisan politics.

American political experience has proved that on the whole the most certain way of securing such a force is through what have come to be known as civil service reform methods, namely, through competitive examinations of applicants for appointment or promotion. Since 1883, when the practical application of these methods began, it has been found that such examinations need not and often should not be confined to book knowledge or to written questions and answers, and that, provided the examinations be fairly conducted by competent examiners, other forms of examinations have been successful to a marked degree in filling positions requiring not only the highest expert knowledge but the highest expert administrative ability.

How shall the system which produces such examiners and such results from examinations be established and protected? The answer is through a board of commission, whose one duty it is to maintain and perfect such a system and whose members shall hold their positions independent of arbitrary removal. Whatever the particular form of municipal government may be, the members of its civil service commission should not be subject to arbitrary removal and should not, in fact, ever be removed because of any difference between the partisan political views of the members of such commission and the power that appoints them.

There should be at least three members of such a commission and the terms should be at least three years, one going out of office each year. In Illinois the civil service commissioners are considered as experts and are chosen as such. Such a commission having the authority to prescribe and enforce the conditions of appointment and promotion but with no power itself to appoint or promote will inaugurate and, with experience, will perfect a system that will keep every position from the highest to the lowest in the operating services of a city government free from any partisan political influence.

Since the duties of such a commission are purely administrative and are not in any slightest sense of a partisan political nature and it is important that the standard of administration in each city should be kept at the highest, we favor the administrative supervision of the city commissions, by a central state board. The supervision should be administrative solely and, properly conducted, will tend to keep the level of local administration high. A local commission conscious of constant criticism from a central state board entitled to investigate and report and under proper restrictions to reprimand and to punish will feel a stricter and higher responsibility to the public for the performance of its duties.

In reaching these conclusions, the committee constantly kept in mind that those officials who formulate and establish policies must be in close touch with the people, either by direct election or through appointment and removal without restraint by those who are elected by the people. On the other hand, operating officials carrying out the policies so determined should hold office during continued efficiency and good conduct, and should be experts of education, training, experience and executive ability, and selected and promoted under civil service rules of a kind to determine these qualifications.

To the objection that an incoming administration should have the power to appoint his own experts in sympathy with its proposed policies, it may be answered that experience both in public and in private work has shown that an executive does not need to change experts in order to initiate new policies. In railroading, for example, a change of administration is followed by few,

if any changes among the civil engineers and superintendents of divisions. When Mr. Harriman took charge of the Union and Southern Pacific railroads, and entirely changed their policies, he kept all the former experts, even the chief legal adviser of the road; and Mr. Hill, in his reorganization of the Northern Pacific and its branches made only one change in its large personnel.

To the argument that experts are likely to become bureaucratic and out of touch with the people, experience has demonstrated that they are very much alive to the needs of the people, are well versed in the latest experience of other municipalities, at home and abroad, and that they often suggest improvements of which the people themselves have not thought, and which have never been made an issue. As a general proposition, neither the people nor the politicians have initiated the modern municipal improvements, but rather the experts, such as physicians, sanitary and civil engineers, architects, landscape architects, bacteriologists, philanthropists, and educators, backed up by civic leagues, boards of trade, and similar public bodies.

It is not claimed that an ordinary academic civil service examination is a suitable method to select experts of mature experience and executive ability. The present methods employed by competent civil service commissions for such positions, however, are not such. There are two general methods employed: one selecting for the lower expert positions through very thorough technical examinations, and then promoting to the chief positions as experience become mature and executive ability is exhibited; the other is that of directly filling the higher positions by examinations consisting of systematic and thorough inquiry into the education and training of the candidates, their achievements, experience, success in handling men, and ability in executing large affairs, and carried on by examiners who themselves are specialists in the subjects under consideration. For example, for selecting an architect, leading architects are the examiners; for engineers, engineers.

High-grade experts of mature experience do not like to exchange steady private employment for municipal services as conducted in the United States today, with

short or uncertain terms during which they are subject to dictation from politicians. Where, however, positions are made practically secure, and where successors can only be chosen by a method from which favoritism is eliminated, and sufficient powers are granted them, experts do apply. This is not only true on the continent of Europe, but has proved true in Chicago, where the city engineer, the engineer in charge of bridges, the city auditor, the chief street engineer, the building inspector in chief, and the chief librarian (with salaries from $3,000 to $8,000 a year) have been appointed under civil service rules. This system has also been successfully used in the appointment of the state librarian for New York State, assistants to the attorney general, and several other such officials, and, in the federal service, in the appointment of the heads of many bureaus, experts with scientific knowledge and executive ability. R. A. Widdowson, the secretary of the Chicago civil service commission, in a letter dated February 14, 1912, said: "The higher grade examinations in the Chicago civil service, which are usually open to all qualified residents of the United States, attract men of the highest calibre where the salaries are on a commercial basis." The same in substance is reported by the civil service commissions of Kansas City, New York City, New York State, and the United States.

When such a system as herein recommended has been in operation for a number of years there will doubtless grow up in this country, as there has in England and in Europe, a large body of municipal experts in the various branches of municipal activity who begin their careers in cities of moderate size or as assistants in large cities, and by promotion from one city to another or within the same city reach the highest positions.

In the United States we have as an illustration of expert accomplishment the river and harbor work. The fact that out of the $627,000,000 actually spent for that work between 1789 and 1911 so little has gone for corrupt purposes is due to the work having been done under the detailed administration of United States army engineers, who secure their positions through strict competition at West Point and who hold their positions for

life during good behavior, and who are only under about the same control as is proposed here for municipal experts. These United States army engineers have nothing to do with the initiation of the work (except in the way of advice) or of the appropriation of funds, and all their expenditures are carefully scrutinized by auditors and comptrollers who disallow any item not strictly within the appropriation and law.

If by this system we should in America succeed in taking municipal contracts out of politics and in putting the control of subordinate employees under persons not looking to the next election, we shall accomplish for the welfare, political morality, and reputation of our American cities a lasting good.

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF, *Chairman,*
ROBERT CATHERWOOD,
RICHARD HENRY DANA,
HORACE E. DEMING,
WILLIAM DUDLEY FOULKE,
STILES P. JONES.

Commission Government and Efficiency

BY HORACE E. DEMING

That city government on its political side has been vastly improved in many ways where the commission plan of city government has been put in operation, no one acquainted with the facts, will deny. Nor will he dispute that on its business side city government has been much bettered by the installation of the commission plan. The contrast between the results of various vicious methods of local government and the commission form which has replaced them must not blind us, however, to the need of recognizing that no city government, whatever be its form, can be really efficient on its business side, where any of the basic principles of business efficiency is disregarded.

Nine-tenths, it would be more nearly accurate to say, ninety-nine one-hundredths of the activities of a city gov-

ernment are expended in the performance of purely business tasks, the successful performance of which depends upon the application of sound business principles according to approved business practices. In no private business is an administrative officer elected by popular vote. Nor does any large private business expect to secure expert and skillful executives of experience to take charge of its various departments without furnishing the assurance that the exhibition of knowledge, skill and efficiency means not temporary employment but a career.

In our American cities—and this is equally true of those which have adopted the commission form—the business side of the government, especially in the higher places where skill and experience are most needed, is managed by amateurs or by casuals. The former are often well intentioned but untrained; the latter, no matter how well equipped by experience and training, are given no real opportunity to be or to become the efficient heads of the great administrative or operating departments of the municipal business. Of course, therefore, city government in the United States is unduly expensive and often foolishly wasteful. And it will remain so, no matter what improvements may be wrought out on the political side, until the business side is placed upon a sound business basis and conducted in accordance with approved business practice.

It is intrinsically absurd to elect by popular vote at frequent intervals the heads of the health department, the water department, the building department and the other great administrative or operating departments of a city government. And the larger the city the greater the absurdity. Nor does it appreciably lessen the futility of such a plan to divide the business departments into say three or five with subdivisions of each. There is, to be sure, a greater chance that, if there be only three or five men to be chosen by popular vote, the general character of those selected will be higher than where the public is called upon to elect ten or twenty or thirty or even more. But the qualities of the vote-getter and of the administrative or operative expert are quite distinct.

The usefulness of the commission plan lies in giving the voters of the city a controlling voice in determining the local public policy which shall be followed. But whatever be the form of the local government on its political side—and this is well illustrated by German, French and English city governments as well as by the endless variety of experimental forms which have been and are now on trial in the United States—if we wish efficiency on its business side we must put every great administrative and operating department of the municipality under the management of men selected for their special training, knowledge and experience of the business duties they are expected to perform. There is no other way if we expect efficient city government. And only so far as this has been done, has city government in the United States approached efficiency.

Contracts in Politics

BY RICHARD HENRY DANA

The Boston Finance Committee, which investigated the government of the city of Boston in 1907-8, made several valuable reports in which were illustrated political contract methods.

Since 1885, Boston's charter required all contracts involving $2,000 or more to be in writing, to be approved by the Mayor, and to be given out after public competition secured by advertisement in the daily papers. These requirements were evaded in various ways. One was to split up contracts into various smaller ones, each less than $2,000; and the other way to secure from the Mayor the waiver of public competition, which right the law had given him to be used in exceptional cases. This right the Commission state "is now so frequently exercised that the exception has become the rule; more contracts exceeding $2,000 have been awarded since February 1, 1906, without advertisement than with, and the giving of authority to dispense with public competition has become a part of the routine work of the Mayor's office."[1]

[1]Boston Finance Commission Reports, Vol. I, p. 83.

Also, since 1885, the Boston city charter provided that no member of the city council shall directly or indirectly take part in the employment of labor, the making of contracts, purchase of materials, supplies, etc.; and yet the Commission found that in spite of the law, contracts were awarded by favor to influential members of both the city and state government, saying "the practice of giving contracts or orders for supplies or work, without competition, to members of the city council, who under assumed names are finally interested in the contracts, discriminates unfairly against contractors who are not in politics, invites laxity in supervision by the city officials, leads to negligence or default in the performance of contracts, increases the cost of municipal work, and encourages extravagance in appropriations and loans. These evils are aggravated when such favors are given to supporters of the administration in return for past or future political assistance."[2]

As illustration of split contracts it was found that each department was in the habit of buying quantities of coal costing less than $2,000, just as they needed it, at retail prices, and often through political middle men who rendered no other service than to order the coal of some dealer who delivered it, to have a bill made out to themselves and then make out a bill to the city for an additional amount which the political middle man pocketed. The same method was applied in the purchase of sewer pipes,[3] cement,[4] broken stone, paving blocks,[5] oil,[6] and other articles used by the city. The quality of articles delivered was often inferior. It was found, for example, that the coal delivered to the city under the name of "New River, Georges Greek," or "Pocohontas" coal from Maryland, steaming coals of the very best quality, was, in fact, a much inferior quality of coal from a Pennsylvania mining district, known as South Fork.

Another illustration of split contracts was found in those for cleaning catch basins, each given to political favorites. For example, three contracts dated December 16, 26 and 30, 1907, awarded without competition to two

[2]Vol. I, p. 85
[3]Vol. I, pp. 228-230
[4]Vol. I, pp. 222-227
[5]Vol. I, p. 232
[6]Vol. I, pp. 228-230

favored contractors, covered 300 basins, 10 of which had no existence whatever, 10 others were duplicated in one or the other of the three contracts,[7] all at a price about fifty per cent over the average cost, and the larger number included in these contracts were those basins that least needed cleaning, so that the Commission say, "The department either planned to give these favored contractors the least work at the highest prices, or its selection of basins was devoid of intelligence."[8]

The way the law against awarding contracts to members of the government was evaded was by giving the contracts to them under assumed names or to corporations in which members of the city government were the chief stockholders. All these methods are well illustrated in the case of F. J. Linehan, at one time a member of the common council, at another of the board of aldermen, and finally of the state senate. In July, 1902, the school house commissioners entered into a number of contracts with F. J. Linehan & Co. When the first drafts of these contracts reached the city auditor's office they were objected to because Mr. Linehan was at that time a member of the common council. On August 20, these contracts were cancelled by the commissioners. Two days later, the commissioners instructed Mr. Linehan how the work might be secured through a Mr. William J. Hallion. Mr. Hallion resided in the same house with Mr. Linehan, never made any contracts with the city of Boston excepting when Mr. Linehan was in public office. On the very next day after which he had entered into four contracts with the schoolhouse commissioners, Mr. Hallion gave an order to the city to pay whatever might be due on one of these jobs to Mr. Linehan, and a few days later signed a general order to pay him all amounts due on any of these contracts until otherwise ordered. As the Commission finally found, "the whole transaction was a transparent subterfuge."

In 1905, Mr. Linehan, who was then in the board of aldermen, obtained through Mr. Hallion several minor contracts and one larger one, dated September 21, without advertisement, from the sewer division of the street

[7]Vol. I, p. 259
[8]Vol. I, p. 260

department, for the sum of $6,545.00 and the appropriations and loans for this work passed the board of aldermen in which Mr. Linehan sat, and for them Mr. Linehan voted "Yes."

In 1906-7, while Mr. Linehan was either a member of the board of aldermen or the state senate, Mr. Hallion again obtained from various departments without public competition 26 contracts or orders, upon which the payments amounted to $34,815.39, and while in the board of aldermen Mr. Linehan had voted for all the necessary appropriations. Seven of these jobs were for different sections of walks on the Boston Common, built for the Superintendent of Public Grounds. These could easily have been included in a single contract and awarded to the lowest bidder. Also, some paving contracts were divided up which normally would have been in a single contract. The payments of money on these contracts were by checks to the order of Hallion, which Mr. Hallion immediately endorsed to Linehan, who in his turn deposited them in his private account at the Beacon Trust Company. An examination of the Trust Company's accounts, Mr. Linehan himself having destroyed all his check books, stubs, etc., show that the account was drawn against at various times for various sums as in the case of an ordinary bank account, and were not paid back to Mr. Hallion as Mr. Linehan pretended. It also was shown that certain of the bids, endorsements, and letters purporting to have been written and signed by William J. Hallion were, in fact, in the handwriting of Mr. Linehan, while Mr. Linehan almost daily superintended the work on these contracts. and his orders were directly taken by the laborers.

Another illustration was the so-called "Railroad Walk" in the Boston Common of 1906, which was given out on "pretended competition." William J. Hallion put in a bid of $8,530.00. Warren Brothers, a large concern engaged in laying granolithic walks of the kind required, submitted a bid some $200.00 lower than Hallion's, about a week before the pretended competition. Mr. Linehan engineered the pretended competition as follows: Warren Brothers' bids were overlooked altogether; then he went to Thomas J. Hind & Company, had a conversation

with Mr. Hind, got a figure, wrote out a form of bid in his own handwriting for $410 more than the Hallion bid, saw this draft copied out and signed by Hind's clerk as a form of bid, and took the completed bid away with him.

Two other bids were secured also higher than Mr. Hallion's, and on these bids the contract was awarded without advertisement or without calling on any other well-known contractors. It might also be mentioned that the specifications for these contracts were drawn up in the Mayor's office but were regarded by the assistant engineer as indefinite and unsatisfactory and were amended and rewritten by him. The Finance Commission finds, as a matter of fact, that Linehan was really the contractor and the one chiefly interested in the contract, and not Hallion.

Early in 1907 Mr. Linehan, who was then a member of the state senate, got up a corporation called the "Atlas Construction Company" and obtained some half dozen contracts or orders in the name of this company from various city departments to the aggregate amount of about $60,000. Only one of these was obtained by public competition. As the Finance Commission state, the "city officials considered that the real contractor was Mr. Linehan and that the 'Atlas Construction Company' was only a name adopted by him for business purposes." The largest of these contracts was for the Deer Island wall entered into by the Penal Institution Department. The contract for this wall was not advertised and the Commissioner was induced to receive private bids from W. J. Hallion and the Atlas Construction Company and as a cover, secured two other bids which were known to be abnormally high. The lowest figure obtained by this "pretended Competition" was that of the Atlas Company for $52,500, a bid some $10,000 in excess of the estimated cost of the work.

The Atlas Construction Company was evidently got up for this particular business and did no business with any other persons or corporations than the city of Boston. This contract for the Deer Island wall was partly on the basis of cost of labor and materials plus a percentage. The Commission found that the actual pay, both for

superintendents and for day laborers was less than that put on the bill to the city and, though the contract in its terms required that the Atlas Construction Company should furnish its payroll, no payrolls were ever submitted to or examined by either the city engineer or the commissioner of penal institutions, or anyone else for the city, and in the opinion of the Commission, Deer Island wall cost the city at least $10,000 more than if it had been awarded as it should have been to the lowest responsible bidder after a fair, advertised public competition.[9]

As stated by the Finance Commission, most of these split and favored contracts without competition were for relatively small amounts and were given to large numbers of persons so as to secure as much influence as possible for few if any of the political middle men and contractors had sufficient capital and machinery for large undertakings. However, large contracts were granted without competition and in a way to give favored politicians an opportunity to secure money and patronage. An illustration of this is the so-called Fenway contract of 1903 and 1904.

A commission to consider the advisability of damming the Charles River into a fresh water basin secured estimates for various work that was required to be done. These were made by the most competent engineers. Part of the work, by a subsequent act of the Legislature, was left for the city of Boston to do. This part consisted of cleaning out the Fens basin and building there an overflow sewer and also building a similar sewer and an esplanade at the back of the houses on Beacon street. All the work that was done by the subsequent commission for the Charles River, appointed by the state, was done within the estimates; while the work done by the city of Boston in the Fenway exceeded them by $400,000. This Fenway job exhausted all the appropriations authorized to the city by the Legislature without the city being able to finish the rest. This celebrated Fenway contract was given out by day work to a single large contractor. A fixed price was given for labor. It was found that laborers were anxious to be employed at a wage less

[9]Vol. I, p. 105

than that fixed in the contract. As a result, great numbers of laborers were sent to this contractor by members of the city government with requests that they should be employed. As the contractor made a profit on every laborer and as he had no interest in economizing in the total number of laborers he had at work, hordes of these men were put on his payroll. When we came to the purchase of cement, for example, which the city was to supply, it was obtained through favored political contractors and middle men at prices from 23 to 50 per cent in excess of the market prices for the same quality and quantity. As an illustration, the Commission found that one political middle man conducted on his own account a cement business with the city "he transacted this business at a company's office, where he paid no rent or telephone charges and employed no help. The company at its own expense made out and mailed his bills to the city and delivered the goods at the railroad station, from which he teamed them to the city storehouse less than a mile away. The cement was bought in carload lots, but retail prices were paid, with a net profit to the middle man of 35, 50 and 60 cents a barrel." This middle man's usual business was agent for the builders supply company, which furnished him with the cement. The loss to the city was estimated by experts to be about $400,000.[10]

Sufficient illustration has been given of the various political methods of controlling contracts. Other illustrations can be found fully set forth in the eight volumes of the Finance Commission's Reports, chiefly indexed under the head of "Contract Methods."

But one very illuminating and important conclusion remains to be stated: namely, that the city engineer, the late Mr. Jackson, and the various experts employed in the departments, some of whom obtained their positions under Civil Service rules, were personally above any political or corrupt methods, and yet they did not prevent the wasteful influence of politics in municipal contracts. Sometimes the contracts were awarded by the

[10]For the Fenway contracts see Vol. I, pp. 101, 223, Vol. II, pp. 206-7, and also newspapers giving account of investigations and prosecutions prior to the establishment of the Finance Commission.

political heads of departments or through the influence of the Mayor without the knowledge of these experts. The city engineer often recommended changes in contracts to secure their better enforcement or to obtain more advantageous provisions for the city or more definite specifications but with that his duties ended. As the Commission found, for any further effort to stop corruption, "the city engineer did not consider it his duty to volunteer advice."[11] In a specific instance the Commission found that the city engineer had interpreted certain actions of the Mayor and a head of a department as a direction to give a contract to a particular political favorite on the best terms obtainable.[12]

These experts were without authority to override the heads of departments. The only way that they could have interfered effectively would have been "to tell tales out of school," either to the newspapers or to members of the state legislature, and any move on their part to do anything of the sort would have immediately cost them their places if they were not under Civil Service rules, and if they were, some means or other would have been found either to turn them out of office or to lower their salaries and otherwise discriminate against them.

PRESENT REMEDIES.

The remedies put in force at the recommendation of the Finance Committee in the way of amendments to the Boston city charter with reference to contracts are: First, to reduce the limit for uncompetitive contracts from $2,000 to $1,000; second, to require before authorizing an award without public advertisement and competition that the head of the department must state his reasons in writing in detail and the Mayor must approve of the same; and third, that the statement of these reasons with the Mayor's approval must be printed in the city record, a weekly official publication required by law.

While these amendments have secured some improvement, especially in preventing the large number of uncompetitive contracts, such as were made previously, it

[11]Vol. I, p. 97

[12]Vol. I, p. 100

is doubtful whether, without the constant watchfulness of the Finance Commission, even this would continue.

There is still the difficulty of inducing contractors to bid who feel they have no political influence, for in enforcing contracts, settling bills of extras, etc., they feel they will not be treated as well as those contractors that have influence with the political heads of departments, and as a result, the best contracts either do not come into competition at all, or put in high bids to cover all possible loss from discrimination against them, while the political contractors, knowing that they will receive favors, are often able to underbid the better men.

Some examples of positions which have been filled successfully through competitive examination:

THE NATIONAL SERVICE

Year 1914-15.

Filled by non-assembled high-grade investigations of careers:

Chief Petroleum Technologist, Bureau of Mines, $4,800.

Chemical Engineer, Bureau of Mines, $4,000.

Year 1913-14.

Chief metallurgist, Bureau of Mines, $4,800.

Senior architect, Interstate Commerce Commission, $4,800.

Senior civil engineer, Interstate Commerce Commission, $4,800.

Senior electrical engineer, Interstate Commerce Commission, $4,800.

Senior mechanical engineer, Interstate Commerce Commission, $4,800.

Senior railway signal engineer, Interstate Commerce Commission, $4,800.

Senior structural engineer, Interstate Commerce Commission, $4,800.

Senior telegraph and telephone engineer, Interstate Commerce Commission, $4,800.

Professor of chemistry, Public Health Service, $4,500.

Professor of pharmacology, Public Health Service, $4,500.

The supervising architect of the United States was the first high-grade expert to be appointed under this system. This was done some 17 or 18 years ago. Since then, though, there have been great frauds in public buildings, such as at Albany, Harrisburg and Philadelphia, the work under the supervising architect of the United States has been done without any charges of fraud, politics, or partiality.

PHILADELPHIA

Chief Engineer at $6,000.

Engineer in Chief for subway work, Philadelphia, $6,000.

City Architect, $4,000.

Chief Diagnostician for Health Department.

All but 2 of 15 Bureau Chiefs. In 2 or 3 years 27 expert professional positions filled by competition, salaries of $3,000 a year and over.

Chief resident physician at the General Hospital. 2,000 beds, said to be the largest hospital in the world.

Chief of Fire Department, $4,500.

Chief of Bureau of City Property, $4,300.

Chief Electrical Bureau, $6,000.

Chief Bureau of Gas, $5,000.

Chief Bureau of Elevator Inspection, $3,600.

Chief Bureau of Highways, $6,000.

Chief Bureau of Lighting, $2,000.

CINCINNATI

Chief resident head of city hospital.

LOS ANGELES

Los Angeles merit system is applied to nearly all department heads—the Clerk, Auditor, Treasurer, Coroner, Public Administrator, Road Commissioner, Superintendent of Schools, Health Officer, Public Defender, Registrar of Voters, Director of the Museum, Librarian, Director of the Hospital, Superintendent of Charities—all of these department heads and others are selected according to merit and fitness in open, competitive examination.

NEW YORK STATE

State Librarian.

Superintendent of Letchworth Village, an institution for epileptics.

Engineers for the State Highways (after conspicuous failure to secure even passable ones by the old system).

Assistants to the Attorney General.

NEW YORK CITY

Fire Chief.

Six Executive Secretaries to Board of Estimate and Apportionment, 4 at $5,000 and 2 at $4,000.

Director of Public Health Education, $5,000.

Superintendent of Employment Bureau, $3,500.

Superintendent of Women Prisoners.

Superintendent of Boys' Reformatory.

Five Directors of Health, $5,000.

Director of Bureau of Infectious Diseases.

Director of Child Hygiene.

Director of Food Inspection, $5,000.

Director of Social Investigation, Department of Charities, $4,000.

Secretary on Recreation.

Secretary on Committee on Markets, to create a system of public markets, $4,000.

Chief Diagnostician.

MASSACHUSETTS

Inspector of Almhouses in State Board of Charity.

Head of Architectural Division of Schoolhouse Department of Boston.

Superintendent of Main Drainage Works (sewer division) requiring a high-grade practical engineer.

KANSAS CITY

City Engineer.
Superintendent of Street Cleaning.
Chief Superintendent of Water Works.
Assessor and Collector of Water Rates.
Assistant City Solicitors (lawyers).

CHICAGO

The City Auditor.
Deputy Collector.
City Architect.
Deputy Commissioner of Public Works.
City Engineer.
Engineer in charge of bridges.
Chief Street Engineer.
Building Inspector in Chief.
Assistant City Treasurer.
Superintendent of the Bureau of Water, Streets, Sewers.
Assistant Commissioner of Health.
Assistant Superintendent of Police.
The Deputy Commission of Buildings.
Assistant Fire Marshals.
City Librarian.
All with salaries from $4,000 to $8,000.
Head and Assistant Physician for Cook County Hospital.

ILLINOIS

Secretary of charities department of Illinois.

MSH 20831

END OF
TITLE